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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
CHARLES RANSOM, #85-A-1643,
Petitioner,
       
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 DECISION AND JUDGMENT
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules RJI #16-1-2010-0244.47
INDEX # 2010-601
-against- ORI #NY016015J




This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Charles Ransom, verified on April 23, 2010 and filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s office on May 3, 2010. Petitioner, who is now an inmate at the
Otisville Correctional Facility, is challenging the February 2009 determination denying
him parole and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months.  The Court issued
an Order to Show Cause on May 6, 2010 and received and reviewed respondent’s Notice
of Motion to dismiss, supported by the Affirmation of C. Harris Dague, Esq., Assistant
Attorney General, dated June 24, 2010.  Petitioner’s opposing papers were filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s office on July 26, 2010.  By Decision and Order dated August 9,
2010 respondent’s motion was denied and it was directed to serve answering papers.  The
Court has since received and reviewed respondent’s Answer, including confidential
Exhibits B and D, verified on November 17, 2010 and supported by the Affirmation of C.
Harris Dague, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, dated November 17, 2010.  The Court has
also received and reviewed petitioner’s Reply thereto, filed in the Franklin County Clerk’s
office on January 12, 2011.
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On February 28, 1985 petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, New York
County, to an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life upon his conviction of the crime
of Murder 2°.  The “REMARKS” section of the sentence and commitment order contains
the following notation: “with the recommendation that the defendant not be paroled”. 
After a postponement in January of 2009, petitioner made his initial appearance before
a Parole Board on February 3, 2009.  Following that appearance a decision was rendered
denying him discretionary release and directing that he be held for an additional 24
months.  All three parole commissioners concurred in the denial determination which
reads as follows:
“AFTER A REVIEW OF THE RECORD AND INTERVIEW, THE PANEL
HAS DETERMINED THAT IF RELEASED AT THIS TIME, YOUR
RELEASE WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE OF
SOCIETY AND WOULD SO DEPRECATE THE SERIOUS NATURE OF
THE CRIME AS TO UNDERMINE RESPECT FOR THE LAW.  THIS
DECISION IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING FACTORS:
YOUR INSTANT OFFENSE OF MURDER 2ND FOR WHICH YOU ARE
SERVING 25-0-0/LIFE.  THE RECORD STATES THAT YOU CAUSED
THE DEATH OF A FEMALE VICTIM AFTER MANUAL STRANGULATION
AND ASPHYXIATION. THE VICTIM’S DECOMPOSED BODY WAS
FOUND INSIDE A STEAMER TRUNK ON THE APARTMENT TERRACE. 
THE HEAD WAS COVERED WITH A PLASTIC BAG.
  
THIS CRIME WAS A SEVERE ESCALATION OF A CRIMINAL RECORD
WHICH INCLUDED AN ATT. ROBBERY RELATED OFFENSE.  WHILE
INCARCERATED YOU INCURRED MULTIPLE TIER III DISCIPLINARY
INFRACTIONS WHICH INCLUDES VIOLENT CONDUCT, FIGHTING
AND A WEAPON.
THE BOARD NOTES YOUR EDUCATIONAL AND PROGRAM
ACCOMPLISHMENTS.  MORE COMPELLING, HOWEVER, IS THE
EXTREME VIOLENCE EXHIBITED IN THE INSTANT OFFENSE AND
YOUR CALLOUS DISREGARD FOR THE LIFE OF THE VICTIM.  THAT
COMBINED WITH YOUR PRIOR DISCIPLINARY RECORD MAKES
YOUR RELEASE AT THIS TIME INAPPROPRIATE.”
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 The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal was received by the Division
of Parole Appeals Unit on June 25, 2009.  The Appeals Unit, however, failed to issue its
findings and recommendation within the four-month time frame specified in 9 NYCRR
§8006.4(c).  This proceeding ensued.
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) provides, in relevant part, as follows: “Discretionary
release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient
performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and
will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law.  In
making the parole release decision, the guidelines adopted pursuant to subdivision four
of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered:  (i) the institutional record including program goals and accomplishments,
academic achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates . . . [and] (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support services available
to the inmate . . .” In addition to the above, where, as here, the minimum period of
imprisonment was established by the sentencing court, the Board must also consider the
seriousness of the underlying offense (with “due consideration” to, among other things, 
the “recommendations of the sentencing court . . .” ) as well as  the inmate’s prior criminal
record. See Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) and §259-i(1)(a).
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be
judicial functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law
§259-i(5)) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety.  See
Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908, Webb v. Travis, 26
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AD3d 614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1051.  Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements.  See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
Petitioner first asserts that the parole denial determination was fatally flawed by
reason of the Board’s failure to obtain a copy of the 1985 sentencing minutes and the
resulting failure of the Board to consider the recommendations of the sentencing court.
A Parole Board considering a DOCS inmate for discretionary release is clearly required
to take into account any parole recommendation of the sentencing judge and is therefore
ordinarily required to have before it a copy of the relevant sentencing minutes.  See
Standley v. New York State Division of Parole, 34 AD3d 1169 and McLaurin v. New York
State Board of Parole, 27 AD3d 565.   Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, where a
Parole Board erroneously fails to review the relevant sentencing minutes such error may
be considered harmless where a copy of the minutes is ultimately made part of the Article
78 court’s record and such minutes reveal that the sentencing judge made no parole
recommendation.  See Schettino v. New York State Division of Parole, 45 AD3d 1086. 
In the case at bar an examination of the 1985 sentencing minutes, annexed to the
respondent’s Answer as part of Exhibit H, reveals that the sentencing judge specifically
recommended that petitioner “ . . . never be granted parole.”  This Court finds it
appropriate to apply the harmless error analysis, as set forth in Schettino, where, as here,
the only parole recommendation set forth in the unreviewed sentencing minutes was
unfavorable to the petitioner/ prospective parolee.
Petitioner next argues that the parole denial determination was based upon
erroneous information in his parole records.  More specifically, petitioner asserts that the
4 of 7 
[* 4]
references to an Arson 2° arrest on May 26, 1983 and a Criminal Possession of a
Controlled Substance 7° arrest on August 12, 1983, as set forth in the criminal history
portion of the Inmate Status Report, were improper since both charges were ultimately
adjudicated in his favor and the records thereof were ordered sealed pursuant to CPL
§160.50.  Petitioner also maintains that the reference to “2 thru 3" jail terms under the
“PRIOR CRIMINAL HISTORY SCORE” calculations on page one of the Parole Board
Release Decision Notice is erroneous since he only served one prior jail term as a result
of a conviction of the crime of Attempted Robbery 2°.
Petitioner’s assertions notwithstanding, the Court finds nothing in the record to
indicate that the alleged erroneous information served as a basis for the parole denial
determination.  See Restivo v. New York State Board of Parole, 70 AD3d 1096.  The only
reference in the parole denial determination to a prior criminal offense was in the context
of the Board’s finding that petitioner’s instant Murder 2° conviction represented “. . . A
SEVERE ESCALATION OF A CRIMINAL RECORD WHICH INCLUDED AN ATT.
ROBBERY RELATED OFFENSE.”  As alluded to previously, it is not disputed that before
petitioner committed the acts underlying his Murder 2° conviction he had been convicted
of the crime of Attempted Robbery 2°.   
A significant portion of the remainder of the petition is focused, in one way or
another, upon the assertion that the Parole Board failed to give adequate consideration
to other, non-offense related, statutory factors.  On the pages of the petition numbered
six and seven the following is asserted:
“The record before the Board demonstrated that each and every factor
weighed in favor of release.  Appellant’s sole prior offense was for the non-
violent offense of attempted robbery 2°, for which he received a determinate
[presumably, definite] sentence of 1 year in the County Jail.  Appellant has
no other past convictions.  Appellant’s program record is exemplary.  Not
only has he completed all of his recommended programs, he has,
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throughout his incarceration, serve [sic] as a role model to his fellow
inmates through example and volunteering in therapeutic programs . . .
Appellant’s Guidance Unit record will also show his voluntary involvement
in charitable fund raisers for several organizations and not-for profit groups
. . . and numerous other charitable fund raisers with church groups.
While the Appellant’s disciplinary record included a number of infractions,
the majority of his infractions, specifically those mentioned by the Board,
occurred during the earlier part of his incarceration.  Notably, the Appellant
has had a few serious infractions, and has had no infractions whatsoever
since 2004.”
A parole board need not assign equal weight to each statutory factor it is required
to consider in connection with a discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to
expressly discuss each of those factors in its written decision.  See Martin v. New York
State Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152, Porter v. Dennison, 33 AD3d 1147 and Baez v.
Dennison, 25 AD3d 1052, lv den 6 NY3d 713.  As noted by the Appellate Division, Third
Department, the role of a court reviewing a parole denial determination “. . . is not to
assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether
the Board followed the statutory guidelines and rendered a determination that is
supported, and not contradicted, by the facts in the record.  Nor could we effectively
review the Board’s weighing process, given that it is not required to state each factor that
it considers, weigh each factor equally or grant parole as a reward for exemplary
institutional behavior.”  Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295,
1296 (citations omitted).  
A  review of the Inmate Status Report and the transcript of the parole hearing
reveals that the Board had before it, and considered, the appropriate statutory factors
including petitioner’s programming,  vocational and academic achievements,  disciplinary
record, release plans, as well as the circumstances of the crime underlying his
incarceration and prior criminal record.  See Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828.  During the
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course of the February 3, 2009 parole interview, moreover, petitioner was afforded wide
latitude to discuss matters he considered relevant to the discretionary parole release
determination.  In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the
Parole Board failed to consider the relevant statutory factors.  See Pearl v. New York State
Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1058  and  Zhang v. Travis, 10  AD3d  828. 
Since the requisite statutory factors were considered, and given the narrow scope
of judicial review of discretionary parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis
to conclude that the denial determination in this case was affected by irrationality
bordering on impropriety as a result of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature
of the crime underlying petitioner’s incarceration and his prison disciplinary record.  See
Veras v. New York State Division of Parole, 56 AD3d 878, Serrano v. Dennison, 46 AD3d
1002, Schettino v. New York State Division of Parole, 45 AD3d 1086 and Farid v. Travis,
17 AD3d 754, app dis 5 NY3d 782.
Finally, this Court finds that there is no statutory, regulatory or judicial
requirement mandating the Parole Board to provide guidance as to in how an inmate
might improve his or her chances of securing discretionary parole release at a future
Board appearance.  See Freeman v. New York State Division of Parole, 21 AD3d 1174.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed. 
 
Dated: February 7, 2011 at 
Indian Lake, New York.        __________________________
                                                                                        S. Peter Feldstein
   Acting Supreme Court Justice
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